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I.

ER

CHAPT

I N TR 0 D U C T I

0 N

His boyhood was

tion

His educa-

took the degree

of Transylvania

of M. D.

University

He disliked

nd began the study of law,

From the

from there

to the village drug store;

medical department

Medicine

passed on a farm.

to the connron schools.

was restricted

farm hatwent

from North Caro-

and hds mother

grated from Pennsylvania
lina.

His father had mi-

of the South.

blood of the North and

was mingled the

his veins

In

1816.

5,

was born August

He

of Kentucky.

Samuel Freeman Miller ws a native

to the

where he

the practice

of

making up for the

deficiency of his earlier training by taking advanttge of
privileges
town in

offered

which he

bar at the age

Iowa.
their

in

a debating club conducted

then resdded.

cf thirty

of hyman slavery.
mancipation

in

one.

He was
He was

in

the

admitted to the
an ardent

opponent

When Kentucky failed to provide for

the Constitution of 1850,

e-

he removed to

He took his slaves with him and there gave them
freedom.

In

politics

he vas

al

first

a whig;

but

Indeed

ly partizan.

he might know

til

desire was

As a

at the Towa bar andhis

forraed the acquaintance

extend311into

and becrnme

recommendation of the entire bar
Miller associate Justice

1862.

The

the

prone Court was

of the Supremre

questions growing out

by the three
changes

in

last

methods

tribution adding to the
under

the

friend of
upon the

Court,

in

The calendar of the Su-

crwwded with cases,

en'ancipated slave, the

vast

fast

president,

the decision of which
questions.

er of the Nation to conduct a war for its

tution

Illinois,

of the West, appointed

required the solution of momentous

the

to eminene

years which followed were eventful as any in

the history of out Republic.

and the

nom-

would

lawyer he soon rose

Lincoln who, after his election as

Mr.

live un-

to be permitted to

practice

first

expressed the senti-

that a Republican presidert

inate his successor.

Ae

said that during the

is

Cleavland he

administration of Mr.
mrent that his one

it

intense-

He was always

afterwards became a Republican.

own existence

of that war;

changes wrought

amendments;
of industrial

The pow-

the rights

in our Consti-

and after

these the

production

complexity of questions

most complex system of 7overnment

of

that

and disarising
has

ev-

3

er existed -

all

these have,

during the past thirty

years,placed upon judges of our Federal courts most grave
responsibility.
To record some parts, of the work done by Mr.
Miller in the solution of these grave questions
purpose of the following pages.

Justice
is t1e

C H A P T E R

II

0-

DECISIONS

OF LB.

JUSTICE MILLER RELATING TO EX POST
FACTO LAWS

"No Bill of Attainder or Ex Post Facto Law shall be
9 Clause 3, U. S. Constitutionj

passed

(Art. I. Sec.

A most

interesting case on this subject

is that

of

(a)
Ex Parte Garland, the

facts of which x:er,

as follows.-

On the 24th of June, 1865, Congress passed an act
extending to all persons applying for riermission to practice la-:s in l'ederal Courts the provisions of a prior
act relating to persons appointed
offices.

or elected to Federal

This prior act required every such

fore assuming the duties of his

office

to declare under

oath that he 1h:d never borne arms against
States;

,erson be-

the United

nor ,iven aid tund encolragement to l ersons hos-

tile thereto; nor held any office under

any authority

or pretended authority, which was hostile to the United
States.

(a)

In 1860 Mr. Garland was an attorney

4 Wall. 382.

and coun-

the Federal

in

sellor

courts,

the seceding states

lie had afterwards
in

c st

of the Fe-

the war

his lot

.ith

bellion

andhid served both as representative

and Senator

in the Confederate Congress.
In

July, 1865,

President

Johnson had granted him a

full pardon upon certain conditions and with these conditions he had complied.

He afterwards petitioned the

Supreme Court for restoration to the privileges of a
practitioner of law
the Act

, one ground of his prayer being that

of Congress was, as to him, an ex post facto law

and therefore voidiew cases
land appeared

have been so ablpy presented.
in

Reverdy Johnson;

his own behalf with

1.

A.

Mr.

Gar-

Carpenter and

while Attorney General Speed for the

United States was assisted by Messrs. Standerry as special counsel.
The opinion of the
tion
that,
fine

void,

was written by Mr.

wh&le the Act
crimes nor

do that

(ourt,

law in

Bustice Field.

of Congress neither

inflict

aery thing;

holding the

punishn-entj

Its

It

quesield

attempted to deeffect

was

to

that to deprive a person of the power

to hold offices and trusts

or of the

irivilege

of ,ursu-

ing the ordinary avocations of life was to inflict punisbrent ; that the exclusion o- admission of attorneys by
the courts

i2 not an exercise of ministerial power, but

raLher judicial -

in short, that

admission to the bar

is a right which can be taken away nnly for moral or
professional delinquency.
concurred three

Justice Miller, with whom

other members of the

orous dissenting ,pinion.

The

court, wrote a vig-

position taken was

that

ex post facto laws could nnly apply to I-roceedings of a
criminal nature;

that

the

law

proceedings wholly of a civil

in

question referred to

nature;

that

admission to

the bar is an act of grace and favor to which no one can
claim an absolute right.

Hence to refuse the privilege

of practising law coiqld not be considered

as an inflic-

tion of pnishment.
The classification of ex post fcto laws enumerated

(a)
in Calder v. Bullwere quoted which, omitting the second,
as practically obsolete is as follows:(i) "Every law that makes an, ction done before the
passing of the law ard which was
inal and punishes such act.

(a)

2 Dallas, 3%6.

innocent

when done,

crin

Everyr 1iw{ <_hat changes tile punisim-ent and in-

(2)

thanthe law annexed to the

ilict. a greater punisliment
crine when conrnitted.

law tihet alters the legal r -les of evi-

Ever;

(3)

dence and receives less or different

testimony thanthe

law required at the time of the conission of the
in

offence

order to vonvict the offender."
To the laws thus classifidd Justice Miller thought
ex,ounder nor conmentator on the -onstitution

neither

That classification was them to be

had added any other.
as complete.

regarded

Act of Congress in

No one of these classes did the

question belong.

It

could not there-

fore be regarded as ex post facto.
Section 10 of Art. i, of the Constitution provides
"No

state

-......

pass any Bill

shall

this clause,

Post Facto Law."

Under

as Ex parte

was decided the

Garland,

Missouri (a).

A new constitutirn,

required teachers,
and voters,
alty,"

ministers

or Ex

at the same time

case of Cun-mings v.

adopted by that state

of the gospel,

attorneys

to take an obligation called the"oath of loy-

the requirements

(a)

of Attainder

4 Wall. 277.

of which were similar to those

of the Act

of Congress

having subsc'-ibed to

without first

upon conviction
was a

of these privileges

Any one exercising any one

acter.

, to fine

liable,

Cumrmings

and imprisona nt.

having perform

taking this oath

first

duties as a iriest without

ed #is

the oath was

of the Roman Catholic church,

priest

char-

their

in

a;chi"
ar

but

This

he was arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced.
sentence of the

stte court was on appeal reversed, the

involved being similar to those decided

questions

From this decis

psrte Garland.

in

Ex

ion Mr. Justice Miller

also dissented.
In after
in

years he seems to have modified his views

regard to the completeness

case of Kring v. Missouri(L,)
to the

He himself, in the

wrote an opinion adding aKring had been in-

there naffed.

list

dicted in the Criminal Court of St Louiss for
murder

in

historyr

the first degree

of bis case

jury fonr tines

is

ty in the second degree.

(a)

107 U.

-.

and -leaded

renr-rkable.

and was

221.

of

classification

in Calder v. Bull.

Ex Post Facto laws

nother class

of the

the crime of

not guilty.

He was

tried

The
by a

once sentenced on a plea of guilThis jlea he claimed was en-

an agreement

tered under
I.e should be

sentenced for

gaue him a

however,

only te-n years.

to withdraw his -plea of guilty
ordered

a plea

in

the

He ap-

Kring refused

was

second degree.

The

to be entered.

of not guilty

At the time the crime

court

ner trial

a

of Missouri '_nd

court

Upon being again arraigned,

was granted.

The

term of twenty fivc years.

pealed t6 the Sprme

court

Attorney that

with the, District

committed the

Constitution

ef Missouri provided that the conviction of such an offence

in

quittal

the
of

that

crime

in

Convicted of murder

tenced
the

the first

the repeal

stitution of Missouri was
law ,nd
majority

therefore
of the

plete.

in

last

placed on

in the first degree and sen-

that

Calder v.

on

prouision of the Con-

of this

, as to him, an ex post facto

Justice
the

Bull

The decision was

any law passed after

court

The appeal wuis sustained by a

void.

court,

opinion asserting
to laws

This provis-

Kring appealed to the Supreme

to death,

ground that

degree.

before Kring was

ion had been repealed
trial.

should be considered an ac-

second degree

Miller

in

the prevailing

classification
ws not
put

of ex yost fac-

intended to be com-

on the broad

ground that

the commission of an offence

which

alters
in relation to that offence or its consequences

to him,

as

is

the situation or the accused to his disadvantage,
ex post facto.

As to what

changes

in

punishment so as

creas -i

a law will amount to an into render it

void under

this

of the constitution as to crimes ireviously com-

clause

mitted, the
value.
vember,

case of In

'e Medl-ey(a)

'he facts were these:-

is

of considerable

On the 29th day of No-

Medley was convict-ed Under the laws of the

1889,

st-te of Colorado of the crimae

of murder in

de-

the first

By order of the court he was remadded to the eus-

gree.

to be by him within twenty four

tody of the sheriff,

to be delivered to the warden of the st'.te pene-

hours

tentiary , by whom

hhe was to be kept in

solitary con-

finement until the fourth week of the month of December,
and on a day to be named thereafter

by the warden,

execut

ted within the walls of the penetentiary.

Mhe statute

under which this sentence was passed beeame

a law July

19, 1889.

The murder was comnitted on the 13th day of

May of the same

year.

Medley petitioned the Supreme court

134 U.

1.

160.

of th

United

Llat
to

was sentenced

which he

law under
it

inflicted

his

crime

new statute

than gas

later statute

this offence, but the court held that the
by death in

increased the punishment
First,

confinement

itary
degree

of this

cretion of the
ed

unlike the

the new statute,

.

previous

confinemnt

rg confinement
Miller;-

"It

mode of prison

life

The, extent

discretion

any person except

and

said,

was

limit-

members

of

spiritual advisers,
Of this

solita-

speaking through Justice

of the essential
as

sol-

was limited only by the diB-

1:rison attendants.

the court

remains

provided for

to execution.

the family of the condemned man, his
his counsel and the

rs.

two F0artiuu-

old,

warden Lnd even that

He might not admit

for

death -enalty

the

and the old inflicted

annexed

Both the

was committed.

it

at the time

in

was ex post facto

punishment

u severer

the

that

alleging

he be released

states for an order th.t

character

of that

it formerly originated was

pre-

scribed and carried to mark prisoners as examples of the
just
The

punishrrent
court

material

of the worst

held this
increase

unlike the

old,

of

solitary

crimes of the
confinement

punishment.

provided th

to amount

Second,

t the tirfe

human race.

the new

to a
law,

of execiution shoul.

12

should be unknown to the condermed rian.
held to amount to additional

punishment.

This too,
Six judges

c,rred, but Juistices Bradley and Brewer dissented.

was
conOf

the opinions mentioned I shall have something to day in
another chapter-

C HAPi

ER

III.

DECISIONS RELATING T0 THE COv1iNrTC2

0'

CLAUSE

CO1STITUT ION

THE

"The Con/gress shall have pow r to repulate conerce
with iorei'_rtions
and amonthe several states

and with the Indian tribes." (Ar1.

Sec.8,Const.)

I..

Some of the ablest opinions ever written by Justice
Miller have
the tin'

be~n expositions

of this

clause.

when Congrees begah to legislate

controlling
thority

imiigration,

a few states

in

facts
master

Out

these:-

By statute

of every vessel arriving

way of

own au-

of such an at-

case of Henderson v . New York

of which -ere

the

on their

attempted to assume dontrol.

tempt grew the

Prior to

(a)

of that

at the port

the
state

f Ne

the
York

was required within twenty four hours of arriving to report

in

;,riting

es of birth

to the mayor
and last

residence

cupation of every 1ssenger

(a)

92 U.

".

of the city

259.

as

not a

the

names,

well as

previous

citizen

of

placoc-

the United

the

as made

It

States.

duty of the Mayor to require
of the vessel a bond condi-

from the owner or consignee

state being compelled to incur any ex-

tioned against the

the bond for the space of two years.
ed for

each immigrant

i. In

being resisted

before

the Suprene

the

first,

one dollar

The enforcennt of the

question of its validity

court where

for the court held,

A bond was requir-

of this bond,

lieu

adnd fifty cents might be paid.
statute

in

of thc y :ssenger nmrfed

or suplort

pense for the relief

Justice Miller,

that

within the

canm

speaking

principle

of

The United States v. Milia) that partof the statute requriing the report
the

passengers

power

on the

requiroments
were

of the names,

was valid as

part

of the

of the

of such a nature

that

of birth

etc.

of

an exercise of the police

state.

statute,

places

Second,

that

the

other

although police regulations,
the

state might not enforce

them because the subject matter to which they related was
by the

constitution confided exclusively to the discre-

tion of Congress.
"is

"Such a statute" said the

opinion,

void no natter under what class of powers it may fall

or how closely allied the powers conceded to belong to

(a)

11 Pet.

103.

the stats
A similar statute enacted by the legislature of California was declared

unconstitutional in the case of

Chy Lung v. Freeman (a) The Californi, statute however,
differed from that in NewYork in three particulars.
First, it applied only to

certain classes of immigrants,

amongst them lewd and debauched women to which class
was claimed the appellant belonged.

Secon4,

it

the price

per immigrant to be paid in lieu of bond was not fixed
but left to the discretion of the state comnmssioner of
immigration.
held for

Third, the only imnigrant who might not be

examination were public functionaries arriving

in their officail capacity.

These distinguishing fea-

tLwes of the statute the court considered made it more
objectionable

than the New York statute;

denying the right of a state,
tion by Congress to protect

nd , while not

in the absence of legislaitself from crimi als and

paupers, held that such a right could arise only out of
vital hecessity and that
by that necessity.

its exercise was limited only

This limit the California statute

went far beyond and was therefore void.
Another'attempt

(a)

92 U. S.

to levy a tax on imigration was de-

275.

Acision in

People v.

Campagni Co.

statute

;,

(a)

of Ie-'ci

York levi d a tax of one dollar on each immigrant landed
to b3 collected dn the transportation company landing
him. The tax was collected ostensibly to pay expenses in.
curred in

carrying out the

inspection laws of the state

Such a law having been passed three
ing the inspection of irmaigrants to
them were

habitual criminals.

days earlier requirdetermine

if

The enforcement

any of'
of the

statute was resisted and the question coming before the
Supreme court

of the United States,

authority given to the states as
the Constitution(b)

it

was held that

the

to inspection laws by

referred only to

laws providing

for the inspection of property and that the q~estion was
void under the rule laid down in Henderson v.

Ne,'; York.

Congress finally legislated on the subject of irnigration and in

the Head Money Cases

(c)

an act of Con-

gress imposing upon the owners of steamers a tax of fifty cents for every alien p-,ssenger landed was held to be
a valid regulation of commerce.
Attempts by states in

(a)
(b)
(c)

one form or another to levy

107 U. S. 59.
Art. I. Sec. 10, Clause 3 U. S.
112 U. S. 50.

Const.

b

constitution.

of the

clause

this

Under this

class

Crandall v.

Nevada

think niay be ment ioned the Case

I

A statute

ground.

the business

tax of one

dollar for ever-- person carried who was

number

of persons

t-equired that

was

each

and the payment

so transported

r rovided for non-compliance
vho was

dall,

make the

I Tenalty

to the

statute

state

United States whete

wa.i reversed.

question was

contrary
The

the validity

taked to the Suprem

court

the decision of the state

The reversal

6 Wall. 35.

in

court having affirrnd

of the tax an appeal was

(a)

refused to

the United States and void.

of

constitution

decisien of the

the

Cran-

required report and when arrested and rlaced on

pleaded that the

trial

of the

with the statute.

of a stage company,

the agent

leav-

month the

tax therefor should be reported under oath.
was

the

of transpurting passengers,

engaged in

It

state

of that

from everyperson or company

provided for the collecticn

ing the state.

dis-

decision was

although the

(a)

put on another

tinctly

of thd

cases requiring exposition

occasion for

nished the

fur-

have frequently

taxes on Commerce be tveen the states

'as put upon the

of

court

ground

the

vias

government

for which the

object

with the

sistent

andincon-

citizens,

its

and

United States government

of

righ t

cont'ary to the corelative

taxes ivr s

thmt the

for me d
,n Railway Gros'-Receipts

Tax

InStatc

(a)

Justice

1'
Miller dissented from the decision of the court v'hich
held

that

In

corTflrce-

inter-state

was engaged in

could leavy, a tax on

this dissent

"I lay down the broad proposition that

said:-

vice nor evasion,
compel the

of other states

citizens
for

privilege

the

goods transported through that
of comnmrce.

state

he

by no de-

words can a

by no form of statutory

contribution or toll

channels

which

of a c~rporation of that state

the gross receipts

state

Pennsylvania

of

the state

to pay to it

a

of having their

by the ordinary

"

The doctrine of the exclusive right of Congress to
control commerce
gress should

between the states
that

legislate

ceived added strength
in

the case

( )
(b)

15.all.

cormmerce must be free-,

from

of Wabash

284.

118 U. S. 557.

Con-

and that until

. Co.

re-

decision which he rendered
v.

Illinois.

(b)

In that

case the railway coilpany app
Supreme

affirming

or Illinois

court

lower* court holding

led P'rom a decision of the
judgment

the

of unjust

company guilty

the

facts were

crimination.

The

nly had charged

one t'irm I

pe-

dis-

the compa-

undisputed t :.lt

cents

of a

100 for the trans-

to New York

portation of goods from Peoria Illinois

city, ,;;hile on the same day and for similar goods

another

firm in a city 86 miles neare. New York city was charged
25 cents per

100 for transportation to

counsel for the

within the
held that

discretion
the

business was

canpany urged that this

ter state comnerce, the regulation of
of Congress.

But

tIaltplace.

in-

which was wholly
The stat-

penalty annexed to the statute

court had

should be

applied on the theory that the statute was a bindinm: regulation as

to that part of this

within the jurisdiction
was

business

of the state.

transacted
This decision

reversed andit -,'as held, that while as to contracts

for transjlortation to be

carri-d on wholly within the

state the statute was valid;
state court

it

yet as interpreted by the

-was an unwarrant edregulat ion upon inter-

state coiraerce and therefore void.

The decisions

in

,,hich the United States
contrary opinion(a)

decided nn other

were declared

grounds.

exclusive right ol

to Px Pres

court had seemed
to have

been argued and

That while "the

question of tt-

Qongress to rmake such re-gulations of

chaor'-es as any legislative power had the right to rake
to the exclusion of the state was T,resented it received
but little attention at the hands

of the ourt."

This exclusive right of Congress to control commerce between the states was reasserted in Fargo v. Michigan (b)

.

A statute of that state provided that the

gross receipts of railway companies carryinp. passengers
or freight

from without into or from w,itiin to without

the state should be suhject to a tax.
(lent of the M. D. & T. Co.

Fargo, as Presi-

, a corporation organized un-

der the laws of the State of New- York, in which state

its

principal office was located, filed a bill in equity
praying that the Auditor General of Michigan be enjoined

(a)

Munnnv. Illinois, 94 U. ",

113-5;

State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall 293;
v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155;
&a6 ev. C. "N Ry. .,o. 94 1. D. 177-8
(b) 121 U. S. 230.

The stat

from collecting this tax from the dorporstion.
state court held the

Justice Miller,

tax valid and an appeal was taken.

wtiting the opinion of the cou'irt,

tinguished the facts in this case from those
Tax on Gross Receipts where

jill

, it

dis-

in State

be rel-rnrbered

. he

first, the Pennsylvnia uorpo-

dissente don two grounds:

ration was organized under the state laws of Pennsylvania,

Second,

this was a foreign corporation.

in that case

was levied on money

already in

the -faat

the treasury

of the corporatic.n and upon property within the state
w,hich hd ceased to hold its
pensation for freight;

in

distinctive character a s cori

this

cese the property to be

taxed was riot within the state and probably never had
been there.

The decision of the State

gan was t-horefore reversedgain considered in
Co.(a).

court of Michi-

The same principle

the case of Battrnman v.

That case came before

g')s

W. U. Tel.

the Supreme court by E

certificate of division from a Federal court sitting
the state of Ohio.
-as
that

(a)

in h

The r articular question lresented

whether a tax levied on receipts
state,

a-

of a corporation in

such receipts heing derived 'Partly from corn-

127 U. S.

411.

o),)

the state
merce carried on wholly within

ed in

that

Tholby invalid or

was

of the Circuit court

decision

part,

of only this valid

The states, however

invalid and

only Iartly

tax was held

Tha

commerce.

to

invalid only as

derived from int r-state

levied on receipts

p art

of

separation or reapportionment

gross and without

the receipts,

assess-

but upon Tihich t ie tax was

connaerce,

inter-state

from

,artly

and

the
f

enjoining the collection

sustained.
, are not left without power to

commerce to
subject corporations engaged in inter-state

W. Yd.

ion in

was

iliis doctrine

just taxation.

Co.

TI.

Mass(a)

v.

a corporation organized under
New York.

line

Its

the

purpose

lais

f

passed

of Massachusetts

the amount of the

of the

for that

assessed a

FollouTing the directions

on the corporai , n.

tax up-

of the

tax was computed as follows:-

ing the sworn statement of officers of the company as
its financial condition, he deducted from the entire
credits.

ital

stock proper

tion

of stock liable

(a)

125

U.

:3.

'Thiis

to taxation.

545.

gave the

w.,s

of

the state

extended into every state

the Treasure-

decis-

The telegraph Co.

Under authority of a statute

Union.

law

.

declared by the

total

takto
cp-

valua-

Ascertaining the to-

tal

number of miles of line owned by the
afid the total

the states and territories
of

il1,

itiin

,Iv st.i

(

Massachusetts

company in

all

number ot miles
the amount of

tax was computed by this formula:Rate times the Total Valuation of Stock times Nun
ber of Miles of Line Within the State divided by
the Total hymber of Miles of Line equals the Amount
of the tax.
Th,- company resisted rayment and carried its case to
the Supreme Co',rt where the validity of the assessment
was affirmed on the ground that

it

was essentially an ex

cise on the capita-l stock of the corporationwithin the
state.

C H A P T E R

IV.

DECISIONS RELATING TO LAWS WHICH IMPAIR
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS.

"No state

shall

pass -

la-

-i -iring

-ligations of contracts . (Art .I,

the

Sec.

X.,

U.S.Con.)

The decisinn of the Dartmouth college Case(a)
that

the charters

the states

granted

in

chsatters
these

t.his clause
considered

charters and the

were

the

case

ratted,

provided that its

therefore

tax

pursuamce

to

protected by

c ontract
Rouse

property shouldbe

was

(b)

by which the University was

authorized the legislatuire

levy of a

Such a

A constitut ion of the state,

taxation.

corporations

The privileges

of University v.

of Missouri,

In

are

Constitut ion.

statute

dopted,

granted.

instruments

of the
in

held

of corporations were contracts between

granting the

which these

ob-

The

.

incorpo-

exempt

from

subsequently a-

to provide

for the

oh r roperty belonging to such institutions.
of this

authority the Legislature

(a)

4 Vhiett.

(b)

8 Wall. 139.

518.

did pro-

25

. tax on property belonging to cor-

vide for tli,

levy of

porations.

The University resisted

courts

state

A majority

pealed.

University

should not be taxed;
had

the state

power to make

and that

the state,

"No

constitution

of the usual kind
of

to divest the state
such a

character,

they are

its

however

supported

contract

body,

legislative

nority said;

of

behalf

in

From

Lhe eby.

Field and

speaking for the misitting

undera state

has the right

taxing power.
great

of

legislature

that the

Miller,

the

was agreed that

Chase and Justices

Justice

dissented.

'his

it

that these

court he'd

st,,te was bound

the

decision Chief Jstice

Mil2 r

Supreme

by aichiCh

showed & contract

facts

this

of the

ap-

University

and the

validity

its

aIfiried

The

collection.

its

any way

in

Questions

of

the authority by which

can never be considered by the

decis-

ions of any court." Had the question been before the
court

for the first

t ime the dpinion of the

would

probably heve

prevailed.

of the court
trine

laid

is

to restrict

down in

minority

Undoubtedly the

as far as possible

the opinion

tendency
the

doc-

of the majority.

Thus

in Memphis Gas Co. v. Shelby Co.

(a)

109 U. S. 395.

(a) a F-as

corn-

pany li-d been incorporated
ee

i

charter

franchise

on the

mount

corporation

of the

was

the state

it

collection

it,

so heavy as to a-

was

privileges granted-

to a destruction of the

was urged that

question of taxations.

of' $250 per year ha-ving be 'n

on the ground that

was r-sisted

of Tenness-

legislature

on the

silent

a license tax

Afteyr,ards
laid

was

by the

bound by an implied contract

no4 to take away those privileges.

The decision of the
II

as adverse to the corporation.

state court

The cort remarking "The

but relief was denied.

It

appealed
surren-

der of the right of taxation must be clear and explicit."
Agreements

corporations by

in charters granted to

which the legislature attempts to divest the

state of

its police powers are void and hence not protected by
this clause of the constitution.
cussed by Justice Miller
tering Co.(a)

The case

in
is

question is dis-

This

Butchers

v.

Crescent

Slaugh-

interesting in a historical

(b)
way as the
It

sequel of the famous Slaughtering House Cases.

will be remembered

that the

legislature

of Louisiana

created a corporat ion to which was given the
right to slaughter aninals intended to

(a)

ill U. 3. 74c.

(b)

1

Wall. 16.

exclusive

be used as food

in a large area of territory which included the

city of'

The I-rivileges were conferred for twent-

New Orleans.

time had exrired the state con-

five years.

Eefore that

stitution was

so amended as to place the

business under

the exclusive control of the police department of the
state.

It also provided that

ness should be

no monopolies in the busi-

granted and abolished those then existing.

The slaughtering company

1-iming the

of this clause of the constitution.
to the Supreme

The case was fought

court which decided against

the original company, holding that

protection

the claim of

the legislature had

no power to contract away the police power of the
where the public health or morals were

state

affected there-

by.
Keith v. Clark (a) was a c',se growing out of the
war of the rebellion.
essee, granted

In

bills

-eceivable

May 6, 1861,

1865

the

(a)

97 U.

for

Tennessee

constitution,

and note

charter of the Bank of Tenn-

in 1838, provided that bills andnotes of

the bank should be
value.

The

of the

-). 454.

taxes at

their

face

seceded from the Union.

so amended as

to i-rovide

that

ank issued after the seccession

should not be received
The

1laintiff,

in

for taxes due,

issued on the date s named in

provided.

.mmn-r before

the

tendered bill'
the orendment

of the

hank

the consti-

ot

about 25 cents on the doll-r.
worth -A that tin
tution,
The tender being refused he 1:ald his taxes and sued the

The suit was

test.

ed for the
the

and the

rurpose

contracts

of aiding the war

court

Suir'eme

court holding

to secede was a

irmmoral and

theredf was

nullity;

that
that

it

was

society;

that during those years

conflict

to the
that

laws or constitution
before

that

United States

in

or was

ba affirmativel7

shovi

done
; tli.t

its

illegal
The

ques-

discussed.at
of the

during all

state

the years

to the existence

of

legislation

in

,not

of the United States

an:, of its

declared invalid the fact

w;i,s

the attempts

of the war an organizaticn essential

was valid;

it

issu-

Rebellion,

of the

which they represented void.

tion coming before the
length, the

had succeeded were

Tennessee

consideration

of

on the theory that bills

defended

the bank issued after

that

±or money paid under rre-

who wias tax collector

defendant

it

b gislation
violated

aid of the
this

wildebe
a lw

of the

Rebellion should

i.d not been done,

and

29

that the bills,
amendment
tract.

therefore,

were a valid tender and the

void as violating the obligation of a con-

V.

CHAPTER

-0SECTION

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE FIRSi
OF THE XIV AMENDMENT
-O

of the United States and of the

citizens

No state

wherein they reside.

of the citizens

imvunities

erty

or

ny tc any person withiin it

The great
the

amendment
in

casesarose

leading

.IV.,

construing

case

The

Sec.

this

ler-islature

clusive

right

bee'ves,

cLives sheep or swine

to

land keep

15 Wall.

36.

nd slaughter
hich werI

equal

1.)

section of
(a).

Theu-

of that state.

corporation created for tIhat purpose

to a

lib-

the

was the Slaughte1- House Cases
Louisiana.

or

of law nor de-

s jurisdiction

law*" (Amend.

-ranted

(a)

privileges

Unitod States.

due proceeds

property without

protection cf the

or en-

deprive any person of life,

any state

Nor shall

of the

states

make

shall

abridge the

any law w'hich shall

force

are

thereof

jurisdiction

to the

subject

States and

the United

in

"All persons born or naturalized

the ex-

any cautle,
to be killed

for

sale within a certain district in that state containing
Any person -excrcO

more than one thousand square miles.

ing any of these exclusive privileges was

to be paid a fixed

The corporation was

penalty.

It

for the use of their slaughter house.
a fine

in

case it

slaughter, /or
desiring to

liable

to

a

Tyrice

was liable to

one the privilege of

refused to an

privile-ges for all

failed to provide aaple

use the house for slaughtering purposes.

An insl-ctor ,;as to be appointed whose compensation
was

fixed at a given price I'r

sisted the enforcement

The butchers re-

head*.

of this act and carr'ied their case9

to the Supreme court urging that

the monopoly was void

as against

it

abridged their privi-

ieges and immunities as cdtizens

of the United States;

conmon right; that

deprived them of their property without due process of
lew,

anddenied to them the equal pretection
On account of the grave questions

of the laws.

involved the cas-

es were given great consideration and the decision was
not rendered until December, 1872.
ion,

rittef

by Mr-

masterpieee and it

Justice Miller,
is

The prevailing opinis

considered his

the production which of all

others

he was accustomed to regard with .. ost satisfaction.
First,

to the argument

I

of counsel for the butchers

case reprnted by Coke, holding a monopo(a)
the opinion replied
void as against common right,

drawn from the
ly

that that

principle held good only as to monopolies

granted by tI-n

that a state

to those

of Parliament

migh.

hnd might grant

citizens

or to any of its

views

to the

might

be citizens

izens

of any particular

to each class.

persons

to

, a

persons within the

that all
its

are citi-

jurisdiction

There was

clear distinction

,

then,

in

between

the ocit-

and citizenship of the United States
privileges

and irmnunities attach

as citizens

hnd

11 Coke's Rep. 85.

innunitis

be-

of the United States,

as distinguished from those privileges

(a)

Con-

.

the Dred

It

state.

Only the privileges

longing to persons

amendment

over-ruled

pinion of the court

Peculair and distinct

doubtful

being cit-

of the United States.

of a state

as

of the United States without

United States and subject

izenship

corporation

provided that

of Calhoun it

Scott decision by declaring

zens

analagous

Irivileges

two hitherto
by this

had been set at rest

trary

to a

such exclusive

Second,

be deemed wise.

questions

had powers

legislature

liarhent,

granted by the Par-

as to those

not

crown,

and inmaunities

to

which such persons were

w'ere

citizens

of the

re protected by this section of the Amendment.

state
The

entitled -s

state

incidental t o citizenship of' the

,rivilees

The

declared to be those which are fundamental-

rights here cAaimed were of this nature, . Hence
protection must be given by the state.

their

Third, The ap-

pellants had not been deprived of their property without due process

of law.

peculiar

It

one.

occurred in

was used in

it

,1as said, was a

the fifth

amendmbent.

most of the state constitutions.

been often construed,
tion could it
Fourth,

The phrase,

had

but under no admissible construc-

be held to apply to the cases in

neither

It

It

hand.

had the appellants been deprived of the

equal protoction of the
have been inserted in

laws.

That phrLtse was held to

the amendment

of the newly enfr .nchised negroes.

for the protection
Doubt w'%as expressed

whether any case not involving a discrimination against
these people could ever be held covered by this provision.

The opinion concluded:-

may be seen in

"Whatever

the history of public

fluctuations

opinion on this sub.

ject during the period of our natural existence,
think it

will be found that

functions required,

this court

we

, so far as its

has always held with a steady and e-

arl Federal power, and

yen hand the balance between state

that such may continue to be the history of its

we trust

to that

relations

to perform which demand of it

con-

a construction of the

Prom this decision four judges most earnest-

sttitution"
ly dissented,

case of Bradwell

She

iefused admission to the bar of Illinois.

v.

had been

Bradwell, because of her sex,

Mrs.

(a)

down.

denying every proposition there laid

same term was decided the

At the
State,

it shall have duties

subject so long as

appealed

from the decision of the stat e court on the ground that

It -,as Yeld

bridged.

United States were a-

a citizen of the

her Itivileges as

that tle right to
one of the

privileges

a state court

was not

to citizenship

of tie United States

Three

nied.

practice law
attaching

andher appeal

of the judges who dissented

in

vas

de-

from the decis-

ion in the Slaughter House cases concurred in this opinion but were careful to
-round

there

thai

sideration

(a

their

concurrence

were fundamental differences
of the

the fundamental rights
The

put

of the
between

sexes.

phrase"due

p'rocess

of law" received careful con-

from Mr.

Justice

Miller

16

Vall.

130.

in

Davidson v.

New

In

Orb ans .(a)
aprellant
draining

case real

1hat

had been heavily dssessed for the Jurpos,:£
swamps near the city

having been

of New

eld valid by the state

pealdd on the ground 'chat he was

duo -rocess

without

held that
land"

be onging to the

esta'e

law

as used in

deprived

The

Magna Charta,

defined;

would be to determine

that

its

Lhat

ing in

a

that

it

coui't of justice.

or b-

servitude
lic
d

use,

were

the policy of the

ed in

t

advanced:-

(ther

whether

burden is

it

of confining
the

As

state authority,

Lortion oIfthe

mode

is

(a)

state

been

process

should arise;

97.

in

hand,

by the

tax,

rroceed
these

lawVs

of a

assessirsnt

imposed on p'roperty for pub-

or controlling 'he

to the

S.
S

a

community and the

ordinary courts

aplropriate

" Whenever

1 he

court

gradual

to the case

be for the whole

of justice

the person or such proceeding
as

court

law (f

had never

meaning by the

i roperty

it did not necessarily require a regular

propositions
state

of his

opinion of the

of inclusion and exclusion as new cases
but

T, e tax

courts Davidson am-

lihrase was equivalent to "The

this

satisfactortly

of

Orleans.

in

nature

state

or

some

limit-

laws irovide for
charge thues

a

impos-

w,,ith ,uch notice
regard to the

cf

the case,

Trop rt

the judg-

to

y

iiient

case cmn not be said to d' Prive

such a

in

Jiay be from other

it

objections."

This deoisinn -,,as in

accord with the

viously decided case

(f McMillan v.

the

of goods

selling

In

Kelly v.

Pittsburgh(b)
to use for

land which he desired
In

e<clusivelh.

rf Pennsylvania the

lature

As

the ground that
due prouess

the

corporate

discretion,

(b)

limits
and

95 U. S.

limits

from the

it

was made

(f the city

That

104 U. S. 37.
7(P.

of the
this

legis
city

land.
in

extraordinarily

on

Federal court

pro]erty without

deprived of his

wby which

legislature

owned

passed bV the

that

The court rerlied

of law.

t-le

()

he was

of

purposes

agricultural

corporate

Kelly asked relief

creased.

it

where

due p-rocess

the appellant

the taxes thereon were

a result

denied.

owner did

to the

so extended as to include

of Pittsburgh was

c: se

for taxes un er a

of an act

pursuance

the

(a)

Anderson

not deprive him of his property without
]aw.

ob-

of the pro-

doctrine

which req''ired ten dais notice

statute

As

appeal was

"he

was covered by these propositions

was held that

ow:fn-

process of law howev-r

or of his 1-ro porty without dzi

noxious

the

the act

possible

was wholly

while the tax was

in

of

to extend
its

own

exceedingly -n-

just

the

coiirt

could not judicially

received no benifits

say tlt

the

owner

from the purposaes for wlich the tax

-eas levied.
It
Mr.

is

a cutious

Justice Miller

the XIV.

ail-endr.cient,

that the

rights

ed by- the

fact

in
in

all

the

Jich he ex]?laimed

opinions

of

-nd construed

but a single ene did he uv r

claimedin the

'rovisions of this

surelyv a strict

in

that

case a

t

amendi-hnt.

constructionist.

hold

bar were protectHere iie was

C 1! A 2 T E R

DECISIONS

CONSIDERING PRIVILEGES

EXTRADITION AND T1E

I.

"......

either

OF REPRESENTATIVES?,

ILIPLIED POWERS OF CONGRESS.

and for' anyspeech or

.

debate

house they _shall not be questione d in

othe r
II.

VI.

__Lace.%rt.

"The

Congress

I.

Sec.

shall

6,

have

in

any

Const.)
,o-yer to make all laws

which shall be necessary and rroper for carrying
to execution the fore

ngpowers;

and all other

jooprs vested by this Constitution in the
o@ th-e

United States, or

cer thereof"-(Art.

A very learned opinion as
that

of Kilbourn v.

jail for contempt

8 Clause 1F

dell

Thompson. (a)

of the speaker of the House

,overnment

in any depratment or

I. Sec.

s inte.-est ing is

Kilboun w-s,

of Representatives,

by order
sent to

in refusing to answer questions before

Thompson wes Sengeant at Arfs

103 U.

S

i

and

took him into custody;.

Jards :sued Thompson and the

(a)

offi-

Const.)

an investigating comgittee alppointcd by the house,

after

in-

fierfbers

of the llo- se

He

vffho,proc-red

for inlawful

his arrest

court

highest

of Colutmbia.

of the District
because

had decided that,
of Representatives,

questions involved at

house of

on either

contempt, and that the power could

implied from the

House of Con-nons

of the House

was unanimously held that the Consti-

It

congress to punish for
not be

court

Kilbourn could not i-ointain his suit.

conferred no express power

tution

That

of the privileges

The Supreme court discussed the
reat length.

error to the

(f

by a writ

court

case .reached the Supremre

The

imi~risonment.

of its exercise by the

fact

because there it

is derived from cus-

toms of the times when Bishops, Lords, Knights and Bur'gesses all met

in the

functions as the
The

sane body and exerciseed judicial

"High Court

of Parliament".

committee before which Kilbourn refused to tes-

tify had been appointed for the purpose
a real estate pool
be

government and his affairs

in

time a creditor of the

process of adjudication by

The action of the House

such a co±Llittee at this
constitutional

investigating

with which Jay Cooke was supposed to

connected, Cooke being at the

a Federal court.

of

in

appointing

time was declared to be

ancroaciuient

an un-

on the rights of the Judici l

of the government

departnent

of the

and the resolutions

House together with the warrant of the Speaker under
and

which Kilbourn was ii.mprisoned was held null
was further held that the

it

However,

Huuse who instigated the
suit

the House in

any other

to protect

the members of Congress not

short
tion

tot

he

bers

offered and votes

done by members

business before

views the decision
right

-nly as

to words

actual debate bitt as to written reports

to anything

held

That provision was

place.

resolutions

for

debate members could not be

in

mittees made;

of the

provision that

questioned

spoken in

nembers

were protected from a

arrest

for damages by the constitutional

words spoken in

void.

it.

of com-

taken-

of the House

in

in
rela-

In accord with these

of the lower court denying Kilbourn's

to maintain his action was
of the House but reversed as
United States v. Rauscher

sust- ined as to the memto the Sergeant at Arms

(a) came

before th e

court on certificate of division from a circuit

court

sitting in New York.

Rauscher had been extradited from

England on the

of murder for which he

dieted.
dictrnent

(a)

charge

had been in-

Instead of proceeding agaisnt han under this
he was

119 U.

arraigned,

407.

tried

and convicted

on the

i.

charge

of having inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.

The opinion of the Supreme court was asked as to whether,
the

lower court

second

offence.

under these circumstances,
tion to try him for this

the court discu,3sed the subject
holding that the

had jurisdicThe reply of

of extradition at length

exercise of the power rests exclusively

with the National government and not

the states;

ex tradited person cannot be tried for an offence
than that

for which he

was extradited,

until

that an
other

he has been

released and given a reasonable time

to return to the

country from which he was taken.

was

It

further held

that this view must control in the case under considerat ion although the evidence

on which the ext5adition of

Rauscher was secured was precisely the same evidence

as

that on which he was indicted for the second offence.
The case was undoubtedly well decided.

Any other rule

would be extremely unfair to a nation delivering up a
gitive

fu-

from justice.
One of the most powerful opinions ever written by

M;r.

Justice

M~iller was rendered

cision of the
marked the
S

cort

in

his dissent

to the

in Hepburn v. Griswold. (a) That

beginning of the

famous

struggle

decase

as to whether

-------------------------------------------

(a) 8 Wall. 603.

Congress had power to make the noted and obligations of
the governent a legal tender in
facts were these;

payment

of debts.

The

in June of 1860 1irs. }iepburn gave to

Griswold her note for $11 250.
and silver were legal tender.

At that time

only gold

Five days after this note

matured Congress passed an act making notes of the United
States legal tender for all
with one or two exceptions
here.

debts,

publis anc private,

not necessary to be mentioned

The note of Mrs. Hepburn remaining unpaid and

Griswold having brought st.it thereon, She finally tendered the full amount due, both principal andinter)st,

in

United States notes whic h ahld been issued under th$i&
The tender was refused.

act of Zongress.

ferent decisions by: the state courts, the
nally carried to the Supreme
andcareful consideration,
ments from more
yers

the

court wlere,

After difcase was fiafter a long

court having heard argu-

than 15 of the ablest constitutional law-

.n the country on the question involved, the tender

was declared invalid inan opinion written by Chief Justice Chase, with whom fo*4
court at

that time being compoeed of ebght members.

The argument
clear.

other judges concurred, the

It

of Chief Justice

was held: First,

Chase was remarkably

that the intent of Congress

as expressed in the wards of the statute was to make United States notes a valid tender for
debts contracted before as
ter the enactment

of

the payment

those contracted af-

,ell as

the

Iecond, that

of the statute.

pow-

er to do this was not conferred on Congress by any ex_frant

press

in the Constitition.

Third, neither could -

authority for the exercise of this r-ower be found in that
provision of the Constitution g~ranting to Congress power
to make necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the express powers granted.

Fourth, the

powers of

Congress being limited to such as were expressly granted
or necessarily implied from those powers expressly granted, it

followed that the act

of Congress was ultra #ires

and therefore void.
The greater part of the i.revailing opinion was given to the
the

statement

of the argument

that

the validity

of

legal tender act could not be sustained under the

theory of implied powers.

This argunrent was based on

the famous canon of construction laid down by Chief Justice

iarshall in hicCullough v. Mlaryland (a) as follows:3

"Let the

end be legitimate, 'Iat it be

within the

scope

of the Constitution, and all mans which are appropriate
(a) 4 Wheat. 421.

which are plainly adapted to that

end, wlich are not pro-

hibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution are

With the propositions

constitutional".

laid down in this canon as r remises, the argument proceeds to show that neither to the powers of Congress to
borrow or coin money nor to issue notes, nr to carry on
war was this act making noted of the United States a legal tender for pre-existing debts a means appropriate or
plainly adapted.

Doubt

as expressed as to whether the

legal tender qualities of the notes added anything whatever to their value.
first

It was pointed out that the noted

issued ,,fithout being

made legal tenders circula-s

ted freely and without discount.
that

the act

laid

down by Larshall because

ter

in question was

and spirit

dinal principle
justice

.6.

It was urged, moreover,

incbnsistent with the rule
inconsistent

of the Constitut ion.
of that

instrument -

let-

It violated the

car-

the establishment

by impairing the obligations

It was contrary to the

with the

of

of contracts.

spirit of the provision of the

Constitution forbidding private property to be taken for
public use without
caluse

just compensation.

of the Fifth Amenchrent,

It violated that

-roviding that no perv n

should be deprived of his property without
la y.

due process

of

In the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice

1,iller,

with Whom concurred Justices Swain and Davis, after point
ing out the

fi ct that Congress was not expressly forbid-

den either to make the notes of the government legal tenpass a law impairing the obligations of con-

to

der not
tract,

and conceding ti-at in the powers granted to coin

money,

to regulate

its value and to punish counterfeitin-

could not be found sufficient warrant for the exercise
of this power, proceeded to argue the question whether
the legal tender act could be sustained by the
essary and proper at the tine

Law nec-

it was enacted, for carry-

ing into execution ahy of the powers exTressly granted.
After

quoting at

length from the discussion of the

im-

p-lied powers

by Chief Justice ":arshall
in the case of
(a)
The United States v. Fisher and r-cCullough v. Maryland
the

opinion continued:-

these remarks

"I have

cited at unusual

length

of Chief Justice 1,arshall because, though

made half a century ago, their applicability to the
cumstanes under
er

o

cir-

-hich Congress called to its aid the pow-

making the securities of the government a legal

tender as

(a)

a rieans of successfully prosecuting a war which

2 Cranch, 259.

and to borrow money which could

no other manner be

in

due

horrowed and to pay the debt of millions
in

paid,

seems to be

the

almos-, prophetic.

er to declare war;

to suppress

sol-

a navy;

of the United "States;

of the Union, and to provide

for

the

pow-

to raise

insurrection,

to provide and maintain

row money on the dredit
debts

to its

which could by no other means be

the field

diers

support armies;

existence

its

to termirate

without such aid seemed likely

and

to bor-

to pay the

commnn defence

and welfare are all distinctly and specifically granted
in

spparate

the midst

clauses

of the Constitution

VWe were in

--

of a war which c-lied all these powers into ex-

ercise : nd taxed them severely.
means

--

of rendering efficient

all

the ordirarr

the several powers

gress above mentioned had been enlarged to their
capacity

a

general collapse

of credit,

of Conutmost

of payrent

and of business seemed inevitable, in which faith in the
ability

of the go v ernnent would have been destroyed,

the Rebellion would have triumphed,
been divided and the people
government
tion

the st-tes

impoverished-

would have perished and

with it

would have
The National
the

constitu-

whaih we are called upon to construe with such nice

47

and critical accuracy."

I have quoted so freely form

this ()pinion simply because it seemed impossible by any
analysis to do justice to the nagnificent argument which
it cont-ins; and because, in my own opinion, it illustrates the mannier and powers of reasoning of 1'r. Justice
Miller better than any other oyinion he ever penned.

A P T E R

-T

VII.

0REMARKS OF THE WORK AND CONSTITUTIOAL
01"

.

JUSTICE

OPINIONS

.iILLER.

0Justice Miller has universally been conceded

M.r.

The re-

high rank as an expounder of our Constitution.
gard in which he is

held is limited to no section of

the ccintry and to the followers of no nne political party or creed.

All grantl to him due honor as a judge

who was fearless; whose private life was spotless; whose
sincerity
His,

and intellectual ability was unquestionable.
I

thimk,

was

genius

ish of the schools;
ing , the

in

the rough.' Ae lacked the pol-

but he had

schools can never compensate -

of conimon sense.

wedge home.

a large degree

His cumulative

Tie always

sentences

are

contrast with the polished ones of Eradley;
he was

equalled by Field;

excelled by Gray;
a single

when lack-

of reasoning reminds us of a

His style

KenTuckian mauling rails.

brawny

that for which,

in

sent

in

the

striking

in analysis

legal lore he was

probably

Hle could not put so much :ieaning

sentence as &hse;

but he excelled them all

that highest form of tudicial reasoning

-

into
in

judicial in-

less of precedent.
flash

he

The

of justice
'ihe

itself.
found little

consonaire

he would havy

doctrine

care-

facts once before him and in a

reached a conclusirn in

To the bar

He was somewhat

power.

Therein was his

tuition.

that the

with justice.

sunmoned

sovereignty

king can do no wrong

favor at his hands.(a)

As to F articular opinions various views are entertained.

With the dissent

agree.

ieither

can I

in

that the doctrine

correct

applied to the

Garland,

is

a

of that dissent would be

cj-ses of these,

who,

imnlike

had not previously acquired a"vested right"

practice law.
essentially

cannot

agree with the view of Professor

Pomeroy(b)
if

Ex T!:rte Garland I

In

either

case tI-e act

propose to inflict

clear distinction

to

of Concress did

punishment.

between the rights

That there
of one

already

admitted to the bar, and an applicant dor admission is not
denied.

But

it

at by no menas follo-cis

one already admitted
mount to punishemift
of his

to the right
While to

that to deprive

to practice

deprive another,

would anot admittd

capacity to be admitted would not amount

ishmant.

The

constitution

itself

prescribes

to pun-

disqualifi-

cation from ever holding any office of profit or trust
(a)
(bO

U.
.
v. Lee, 106 U. 3. 196.
Pomeroy on Const. Law, p. 464.

Surely it will

as a punislmnent for certain crimes.(a)
not be asserted that

punishnrmnt;

this does not inflict

but I have yet to see the man who is

hardy enough to as-

sert that he has a"vested right" to hold office in the
future under the government
In re Cooper (b)
peared as counsel,

of the United States.

In

a case in which Professor Dwight apit

was held that in

admitting attor-

neys to the bar the court acts judicially,

and that ev-

ery qualified applicant has a s~bstantial right to be
admitted.

Can we say that q law which,

ces takes away substantial rights,

for past offen-

inflicts no punish-

ment?
True,

ts the dis.ienting opinion urged,

ex post fac-

to laws are, or should be, enforced only in criminal prorue the re-admiesion of Gnrland was a pro-

ceedings.

ceeding which was,
its nature.

or ought to have been, wholly civil in

But can Congress

be permitted to avoid this

safeguard of the Constitution rmerely by providing that
its

otherwise

its otherwise

inhibited decrees shall be carried out and
inhibited punisment

ceeding of a nature wholly civil?

(a)
(b)

inflicted

in

a pro-

Indeed, tle most o-

Art. I., Sec. 3 Clause 7 U. S.
22 L. y. 67.

Const.

diousness feature Bf the law in question wasin the fact
it

essentially

fene

in

a proceeding

of a

persons

nature ,here

civil

could be compelled to give testimony against
,nd

where

of an of-

1,unishment

provided for tle

',!at

themselves

no one of those peculiar and sacr-d safeguards

which exp erience has proved to be necessary for the protection of Tersons accused of crime could be invoked.
In

no other

case

in

on to expound this

which Elr.
clause

Justice

.Iiller

such a narrow meaning.

In

re Medley he favored a very liberal

In

Kring v.

the safety of society.

te

In

cases he adopts views

dissenting

facto laws -

opiniot

by any commentator

the

to be
first

of these

then recognized

opigion4

last

'x

pat

class-

an addition which, in this

he asserted had never
on or expounder

be n attempted

of the aonstitution.

I do not wish to beunderttood as criticising
later

consistent

of the majority in

Garland and adds another to the

es of ex post

Missouri and in
rule of construc-

tion in the opinion of some too liberal

n-entirned

called

of the Constitution did he rrive

it

witht

was

these

Ex post facto laws are so obnoxious from

an ethical standpdint and so closely intrerwoven with
many of the darkest

legislative

crimes that

ges of English history that I have come

blot the pa-

to believe every

law of a retrospective

n ture should be jealously regardI rovision of the Constitut ion

ed by the courts and this
most

times a Kring or a

construed although at

liberally

Ledley shoid

thereby escape just

puhishment.

Of his decisions maintaining the
Congress to control

comr.merce between

exclusive
the states

tween the United States and foreign nations
truly

said that

trines

laid

down in

Maryland(b)
fearlessly

they deserve

were always so far
applied and

and circumstares
disadvantages.

-(c)

The

Leisy v.

the destruction

of the prohibitionists

it

can be
doc-

The

and Brown v.

as his influence went,

extedned to meet new conditions

in

doctrine

Hardin(d)

necessary result but even
sulted in

Ogden(a)

of

and be-

high commendation.

Gibi-ons v.

rirht

is

not without

was

its

its

logical and

should this doctrine have reof the

interesting

experiments

reg rd to the control

of the

liquor traffic it would have been more than compensated
for in

the blessings of a

commerse unrestricted

by the

dictates of local prej'udices and unfettered by the decrees

of stL?,te legislatures.

(a)

9 Wheat. 1.

(b)
12 Wheat. 419.
(c)Clinton Bridge Case, 1
(d)
135 U. S. 100.

Voolworth,

150.

The dissenting
Rouse lays

down a doctrine which aside
-. o poer

tundoubtedly to control.

ought
tial

Wfashington University v.

opinio;1 in

the

The police powers,

tion.

of public

support

tice,

adk-inistration
-

institutions

essent&

more

is

thanthat

of sovereignty

to the existence

decisis

from stare

of taxa-

of jus-

fe ct

in

every

depends on

is

instdtutud,

power.

In

our theory of *government

vnder written constitutions

the

purpoee

for which gover nment

the exercise

of this

gent

of the sovereign po,,er.

thority

expressly granted it

power

essential

to the

legislature

but

the a-

When going beyond the aupresumes

existence

contracts made

by an agent without

principal

as against

that

to barter

of the state

can see no reasdn why the familiar rule

are,

is

away the
itself

I

of agency that

the afithority of his

principal,

unenforceable,

should not be rigorously applied.
Of the dissent
well said:-arguments
defence

Hepburn v.

and principles

tender acts't(a)

Law Review,

414.

it

andin full

which must constitute

involved would require

18 Am.

6'riswold,

presents adequately

of the legal

questions

(a)

"It

in

has been
force the
the

sole

To discuss the

an entire

volume rather

than the few word s

I

provision of

express

can give it

he Constitut ion can authority for
The ylain meaaing

legislation be found.

this

Clearly under no

here.

words used must be distorted;

of the

the history of the formaauthority of

tion of the Constitution disregarded;

the

such eminent constitutional lawyers as

,'ebster and Story

trampled -inder foot before
by express

tution

authority

In

grant or by inference,

tender

gress granted

that

in

power by inference

ly holds this

is

to be so,

dark hours of the rebellion,

the courts
man(a)

Con-

time of war?

this

I

case direct-

of the goverrment

adin

remains unanswered and

Beyond that

opinion I

should ever have gone.

must always stand as

Is

the argument htere

drawn from the necessities

unanswerable.

in

opinio#. in

and thal

of the United

debte.

the paynntof

believe that the dissenting

the

gives Congress

times of peace to make ndteds

States a legal

vanced,

that the Consti-

we can assert

In

doi

not think

Julliard

v.

a sad illustration

Gree-

of Feder-

alism gone mad.
Writing of the decision in
in 1875,

Cases
that

it
(a)

the Slaughtering House

Professor Pomeroy expressed

could hardly be regarded as final;
110 U.

S.

the
that

opinion
the de-

Cisision might have been put
in

his 6pinion the views

of the minority would

in

time

Thii prophecy has not been ful-

come to be accepted.

to the

of the states

The relation

filled.

and that

on other grounds,

Federal gov-

era ins unchanged(a) •

ernment

It was pardonable pride, when speaking before the
law students of the 11ational University at Washington,
i,,Ir.

Justice

Liiller himself said:-

deeis-

"Although this

ion did not meet the approval of 6our out of nine of the
judges on some points on which it rested yet public sentiment

as found

in

the press and in

the universal

escence which it received, accepted it with
and although there

imity;

were

intimations

acqui-

great unanthat

the

in

branch of the government the opinion would

legislative

be reviewed and criticized unfavorably, no such thing
has

occurred in the fifteen years which have

since

it was delivered.

great

powers

the Federal

elapsed

The necessity of the
to

conceded by the Constitution originally
government

and the

equal necessity of the

autonomy of the states and their power toregulate
domestic affairs remain as

their

the great feature of our com-

plex form of government" .(b)
(a)
(b)

.
436.
In re Kernmler, 136 U.
on the Const. of the U.
Liller

;.,

p.

412.

These words were spoken in the spring of 1890.

In

the Autumn of the same year the kind hearted but brave
and fearle ;s jurist who tttered them passed to his re4

ward.

This great decision rhis

fitting monument;

for it is not too much to say that because of it our government remains an "indestructible union of indestructible states,,.

A.Y,

____-0
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